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In recent years a number of philosophers have begun proposing normative principles to regulate 
international trade.2 A fundamental question which must be addressed by any normative account 
of international trade concerns what can be traded, and with whom. That this question is worth 
asking reflects the fact that the moral permissibility of trading certain commodities, and the 
moral permissibility of trading certain commodities with particular agents, is contested. 
Controversy surrounds transfers of hazardous waste from rich to poor countries3; the sale of 
emissions permits4; the purchase of natural resources from tyrannical regimes5; and a variety of 
other international exchanges. In this paper I explore the ethical dimensions of one controversial 
international trade, namely, the arms trade. The arms trade merits attention for a number of 
reasons. First, it has been largely neglected by political philosophers. While various aspects of 
international trade have recently been subjected to philosophical scrutiny, the arms trade has 
been virtually ignored.6 Second, the arms trade bears heavily on the achievement of basic needs, 
that is, needs which must be met if an individual is to lead a minimally decent life. More 
specifically, the arms trade bears on the achievement of security. All weapons have the capacity to 
incapacitate, injure, and kill: in short, all weapons have the capacity to cause serious physical 
harm. Furthermore, they are purchased because they have that capacity. Their capacity to cause 
serious physical harm makes trade in these commodities particularly controversial, and 
particularly worthy of philosophical inquiry. Third, the arms trade is politically salient. Since the 
terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, the US government has drastically ramped up arms sales 
to oppressive regimes regarded as valuable allies in the ‘war on terror’, and in the years since the 
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Arab Spring large quantities of weapons have been transferred to rebel groups seeking to topple 
despotic rulers. It is thus important to question whether such transfers can be justified. 
The paper unfolds as follows. In the first section I introduce the notion of a right to 
security, and show that that right can play a central role in justifying the arms trade. I then move 
on to show that the right to security can also ground a prima facie case for restricting the arms 
trade in certain ways. More specifically, I argue that the right to security grounds a prima facie 
case for the claim that states are duty-bound to refrain from trading certain types of weapons, 
and to refrain from selling weapons to regimes which exhibit an oppressive character. Section II 
explicates, and responds to, an argument commonly used to defend the sale of arms to 
oppressive regimes. According to this argument, states have a special duty to protect the security 
of their citizens, and discharging that duty will sometimes involve providing weapons to those 
oppressive regimes which are well placed to suppress terrorist threats. In section III I consider, 
and rebut, two further objections to the claim that states must refrain from selling weapons to 
oppressive regimes. The first argument appeals to the claim that arms sales to oppressive regimes 
can pave the way to improvements in the human rights practices of those regimes, while the 
second appeals to the claim that oppressive regimes will inevitably acquire weapons from 
somewhere. In section IV I consider the permissibility of supplying weapons to rebel groups 
engaged in revolutionary war against an oppressive regime. I argue that while supporting such 
groups may be permissible, or even required, supporting them by providing arms is, from a 
moral perspective, highly problematic. 
When I use phrases like ‘states are duty-bound to refrain from selling weapons to X’ I 
shall mean both that states are themselves duty-bound to refrain from selling weapons to X, and 
that states are duty-bound to prevent their citizens (e.g. their arms companies) from selling 
weapons to X. While it is plausible to think that states are required to refrain from doing certain 
things which their citizens are permitted to do, I take it that the reasons I adduce in support of 
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the claim that states are duty-bound to refrain from making certain arms transfers also support 
the claim that citizens are duty-bound to refrain from making those transfers. I also take it that 
the duties borne by citizens can permissibly be enforced by the state. The duties I identify are 
conceived of as duties of justice, and, more specifically, as duties to refrain from engaging in 
activities which violate the (security) rights of others. I endorse the standard view that such 
duties may be coercively enforced. 
I. 
It is natural to feel instinctively uneasy about the existence of markets in weapons, and some 
activists call for the arms trade to be completely abolished.7 While this stance is, perhaps, 
understandable, it is, I think, ultimately misguided: an ethically defensible arms trade is possible. 
The first step in my argument for this claim is to note that all persons have a right to security, or, 
perhaps more accurately, that all persons have a cluster of security rights: rights not to be 
assaulted, tortured, raped, killed, and so forth. In short, all persons have a right to physical safety.8 
As Henry Shue has observed, no one would be willing to deny that all persons possess this 
minimal right.9 The right to security generates a variety of correlative duties. For now, notice that 
it puts states under a duty to protect the security of their citizens. The next important step in the 
argument is to point out that, in order to discharge this duty, states need weapons (or at least that 
in all realistically imaginable scenarios they need weapons). Without weapons, states would be 
unable to protect their citizens from armed aggressors (armed criminals, terrorist groups, 
belligerent regimes, etc.). Weapons enable states to both deter and repel such threats, and thus to 
protect their citizens’ security. 
It might be said that, in theory, states could protect their citizens’ right to security not by 
acquiring weapons with which to deter and repel armed aggressors, but rather by bringing about 
the worldwide abolition of weapons. There are multiple reasons for dismissing this claim. First, 
and most obviously, bringing about the worldwide abolition of weapons is not an option that is 
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realistically available to states. Second, even if states agreed to mutual disarmament there would 
always be the very real possibility that certain states would secretly retain their arsenals. And, 
third, even if mutual disarmament was achieved at time T, there would always be the very real 
possibility that certain states would (perhaps secretly) rearm at time T + n. When a state disarms, 
it leaves itself and its citizens vulnerable, even if other states have also agreed to disarm. 
Now, some states lack the capacity to produce their own weapons, or at least to produce 
weapons of adequate quality and in sufficient quantities. Consequently, in order to acquire 
weapons of adequate quality and in sufficient quantities, and to discharge their duty to protect 
the safety of their citizens, such states must import weapons from abroad. If these states were 
unable to import weapons – if no international trade in weapons was permitted – they would not 
be able to ensure the security of their citizens. Blocking all international arms transfers would 
penalize states which lack the capacity to produce their own weapons, and unjustifiably 
jeopardize the security of the people who live in those states.10 
The argument presented in the previous paragraph establishes that international trade in 
(at least certain kinds of) weapons can be morally permissible when it consists in transfers to 
states which lack the capacity to produce weapons (of adequate quality and in sufficient 
quantities), and which import weapons in order to discharge their duty to protect their citizens’ 
security. But a great many international arms transfers are not of this kind. For most of the 20th 
Century, the largest arms exporters mainly sold weapons to other economically developed 
countries11, most of which, by virtue of being economically developed, presumably either 
possessed or could acquire the capacity to produce weapons of adequate quality and in sufficient 
quantities. The argument presented above does not explicitly vindicate these kinds of transfers, 
but it does provide the resources needed to do so. It establishes that weapons have a legitimate 
function, viz. they enable states to discharge their duty to protect the security of their citizens. 
And if weapons have a legitimate function, it is hard to see why trade in weapons would only be 
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morally permissible when it consists in transfers to states which lack the capacity to produce 
weapons of their own. If a state possesses the capacity to produce its own weapons, but has a 
comparative disadvantage in weapons manufacturing, it makes sense for that state to purchase 
weapons from abroad and to devote the resources it would have otherwise used to manufacture 
weapons to alternative lines of production. If weapons have a legitimate function, then it is at 
least prima facie acceptable for a state to produce weapons, and if it is acceptable for a state to 
produce weapons, it is acceptable for a state to eschew weapons production and purchase 
weapons from abroad, which a state has a good reason to do when it lacks a comparative 
advantage in weapons production. 
The arms trade, then, can be justified by appeal to the right to security.12 States are 
permitted to purchase weapons either because doing so is (i) necessary to protect their citizens’ 
security, or (ii) the most efficient way of protecting their citizens’ security. And in order for a 
state to be able to purchase weapons, others must be permitted to sell weapons. (A state is able 
to purchase weapons provided that there is at least one supplier, and irrespective of whether 
private firms are permitted to sell weapons in addition to state-owned firms, but the advantages 
associated with allowing multiple suppliers to compete in a market at least ground a presumption 
against denying firms permission to offer their services.)13 
So far, I have defended the moral permissibility of (a form of) the arms trade by 
appealing to the value of security. But that same value can be used to identify moral limits to the 
arms trade. More specifically, the value of security can be used to discern limits on the range of 
weapon-types which may permissibly be traded, and on the range of appropriate recipients of 
arms transfers. There is much to say about the latter issue, but, first, let us briefly address the 
former. All weapons are designed to incapacitate, injure, or kill, and so all weapons pose a threat 
to individuals’ physical safety. But some weapons pose an unacceptably large threat to individuals 
who have not made themselves liable to attack, and who are thus not permissible targets. 
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Paradigmatic examples of such weapons include land mines and nerve gas, both of which kill 
and maim indiscriminately. These weapons pose a threat which is either spatially- or temporally-
extended to an unusual and excessive degree. Nerve gas generates harms which are highly 
diffuse; it can travel large distances and kill non-combatants far from the battlefield. The threat 
posed by landmines has a shorter range, but extends far into the future: people continue to be 
killed and dismembered by unexploded mines long after hostilities have ceased. Ammunition 
containing depleted uranium, which was used extensively by British and US forces in Iraq and 
the Balkans, also potentially falls into this category. Upon impact, depleted uranium shells release 
radioactive particles which are potentially cancer-causing, persist in the environment for decades, 
and can travel far from the site where they were originally released.14 
It is not my intention to discuss this issue in any depth, for the primary question 
regarding weapons in this category is whether it is ever permissible to use such weapons, and thus 
whether they should be manufactured in the first place. But, given that these weapons exist, and 
that states possess them, it is worth at least acknowledging that if their use is impermissible, their 
sale is too. If, for agent-neutral reasons, it is impermissible to use a particular item, it is also 
impermissible to enable, and benefit from enabling, the use of that item by others.15 
Let us now consider limits imposed by the right to security on the range of appropriate 
recipients of arms transfers. I noted earlier that the right to security imposes upon states a duty 
to protect the security of their own citizens. In addition to this duty, the right to security puts 
states under a duty to refrain from depriving any person, wherever she resides, of the substance 
of that right. Indeed, ‘the core of the right [to security] is a right that others not act in certain 
ways’16, and, given their capacity to inflict great harm, states are certainly included amongst those 
others. Some states fail to honour this duty with respect to individuals living beyond their 
jurisdiction. They behave in an aggressive and provocative manner, waging unjust wars, arming 
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rebel groups attempting to overthrow legitimate governments, and supplying weapons to 
terrorist organizations. Sometimes they engage in terroristic activity themselves.17 
Some states violate the security rights of their own citizens. Some fail to provide an 
adequate degree of security, while others actively deprive their citizens of their security. Their 
police and military forces kill unarmed protesters, torture dissidents, beat prisoners, rape 
civilians, and engage in various other violent crimes. For many individuals, the very agent that is 
duty-bound to protect them represents the primary threat to their security. Indeed, 
acknowledgement of the threat states pose to their own citizens has recently prompted a shift of 
focus among scholars and international institutions from the security of states (state security) to 
the security of individuals (human security).18 
While it is clear that duties generated by the right to security are violated by regimes 
which kill and injure innocent members of their own citizenry, or aggress against foreign 
countries, I submit that those duties are also violated by states which provide arms to regimes 
which kill and injure their own citizens or aggress against foreign countries. When a state arms 
such regimes it facilitates, and thus becomes complicit in, those regimes’ crimes. States are 
therefore morally required to refrain from arming such regimes.19 In the following two sections, I 
hope to vindicate this claim. The proposition is, I think, intuitive enough, but it is vulnerable to a 
number of objections. I will focus on defending the claim that states must refrain from selling 
(and must prevent their citizens from selling) weapons to regimes which oppress their own 
citizens, but most of what I say also applies to states which aggress against other countries. 
II. 
The claim that states must refrain from arming oppressive regimes can be resisted in the 
following manner. One might argue that the duties generated by the right to security sometimes 
conflict, in the sense that situations sometimes arise in which a state must choose between 
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discharging its security-related duties to its own citizens and discharging its security-related duties 
to citizens of other states. In such cases, the argument claims, states may permissibly opt to 
discharge their duties to their own citizens, at the expense of the fulfilment of their duties to the 
citizens of other states. Or, put more modestly, states may permissibly opt to discharge certain 
duties to their own citizens, at the expense of the fulfilment of certain duties to the citizens of 
other states. The argument continues: states can sometimes enhance the security of their citizens 
by providing weapons to oppressive regimes, because such regimes are sometimes willing to 
contribute to the suppression of terrorist threats. When states can enhance the security of their 
citizens in this way, they are duty-bound to transfer arms to oppressive regimes. 
 This argument can be used to defend recent US foreign policy decisions. Since the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the US has increased arms supplies to a variety of 
oppressive regimes on the grounds that those regimes, if well equipped, can play a valuable role 
in the ‘war on terror’, and thereby positively contribute to the security of US citizens. As Rachel 
Stohl and Suzette Grillot observe, recent US arms export policy has put commitments to refrain 
from arming oppressive regimes 
on the backburner in order to give highest priority to countries which are supporting US efforts 
in Iraq and Afghanistan and which assist in the eradication of international terrorist networks… 
An analysis of twenty-five countries that play strategic roles in the United States’ global anti-
terror operations finds that the events of 11 September 2001 have dramatically increased US 
arms sales to countries that have been repeatedly criticized by the US State Department for 
human rights violations… In 2006, the US State Department reported that ‘serious’, ‘grave,’ or 
‘significant’ abuses were committed by the government or state security forces in more than half 
of these twenty-five countries.20 
It is tempting to reply to the claim that sates have a duty to arm oppressive regimes 
when, by doing so, they can enhance the security of their own citizens by arguing as follows: a 
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state’s duty to enhance the security of its own citizens is a positive duty, whereas a state’s duty to 
refrain from undermining the security of others is a negative duty, and that, other things being 
equal, honouring negative duties takes priority over discharging positive duties. This strategy has 
two weaknesses. First, some people will deny that the distinction between positive and negative 
duties carries much (if any) weight. And, second, it is not obvious that a state’s duty to enhance 
the security of its citizens is best conceived of as a positive duty. One might maintain that there 
is a negative duty not to assume a particular role and then fail to perform the functions 
associated with that role21, that providing security is a primary function of the state, and that state 
officials therefore violate a negative duty when they decline to take measures necessary to 
enhance the security of their citizens. Given these weaknesses, I will criticize the claim that states 
must arm oppressive regimes when doing so conduces to their citizens’ security without 
appealing to the distinction between positive and negative duties. I will identify four problems 
which the claim faces. 
The first problem the argument encounters concerns its empirical claim that states can 
enhance the security of their citizens – and, more specifically, reduce the threat they face from 
terrorism – by arming certain oppressive regimes. In a recent discussion of trade-offs between 
security and liberty, Jeremy Waldron argues that those who recommend curtailing civil liberties 
in order to reduce the threat to security posed by terrorist organizations must show that the 
curtailments they propose will actually have a positive impact upon security.22 An analogous 
argument applies here. Those who advocate arming oppressive regimes on the grounds that 
doing so will enhance domestic security must be able to convincingly demonstrate that the 
security gains they envisage will actually be forthcoming. They must, in particular, be able to 
counter the common claim that arming a regime which a terrorist group opposes will actually 
increase that group’s hostility towards us, swell its ranks, and strengthen its resolve. This will not 
be easy. 
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 A second problem concerns the argument’s normative claim that states have a duty to 
arm oppressive regimes when doing so enhances the security of their citizens. This claim is 
problematic because the right to security is not plausibly conceived of as a right to be maximally 
secure. This is not just because, specified in such a way, the right to security could not be 
adequately reconciled with other rights (such as the right to privacy), or because, specified in 
such a way, it would generate duties which are, in an absolute sense, overly demanding. It is also 
because the interest in being maximally, as opposed to reasonably, secure is just not weighty 
enough to place others under a duty. To illustrate this point, consider the duties imposed upon a 
mother by her child’s right to security. The mother may be able to enhance her child’s security by 
hiring a guard to patrol the perimeter of their house; hiring a security guard might reduce the 
probability that a dangerous intruder will break in and pose a threat to the child. Moreover, 
hiring a security guard might not be financially burdensome (suppose the mother is quite 
wealthy), and we can stipulate that hiring a security guard would not violate anyone’s rights (or 
wrong anyone in any other way). Still, provided that the probability of a house invasion is already 
low – suppose the mother and child live in a reasonably safe neighbourhood, and other 
reasonable security precautions are taken (an intruder alarm has been installed, doors and 
windows are locked at night, etc.) – it just does not seem plausible to claim that the child’s right 
imposes upon her mother a duty to hire a security guard. By hiring a security guard the mother 
goes beyond the call of duty; she provides her child with more than the adequate degree of security 
to which her child is entitled. The upshot of these considerations is this: in order to show that 
the right to security imposes upon states a duty to transfer arms to oppressive regimes it is not 
sufficient to show that such transfers will have a positive impact on security; rather, what must 
be shown is that arming oppressive regimes will ensure that people enjoy the adequate degree of 
security that the right to security is a right to. 
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 Suppose that the previous two problems can be surmounted. Suppose we have good 
reason to think that by arming oppressive regimes a state can increase, and not diminish, the 
amount of security enjoyed by its citizens, and that that extra security is owed as a matter of 
right. A third problem is that, in order to vindicate the provision of weapons to oppressive 
regimes, it must be shown that there are not acceptable alternative methods for generating the 
extra security which such provision offers. If a state has the means to provide the security to 
which its citizens are owed without arming oppressive regimes, advocates of the latter strategy 
must explain why those alternative means are unacceptable.23 
 The final problem is also the most serious. Suppose that our interest in a certain quantity 
of security is sufficiently weighty to impose upon our state a duty to provide us with that 
quantity of security. Suppose, too, that our state can only provide that quantity of security by 
supplying weapons to an oppressive regime. Even if these conditions hold, it does not follow 
that our state is under a duty to supply the weapons. This becomes clear when we notice that the 
duty which our interest in a particular quantity of security imposes upon our state has not yet 
been adequately specified. This duty is not plausibly conceived of as a duty to provide the 
relevant quantity of security whatever it takes, but rather as a duty to provide that quantity of 
security if and when it can be provided through morally permissible means. 
Consider an analogy. Suppose I am expected to attend a close friend’s wedding, and that, 
on the way to the ceremony, I get caught in a traffic jam. As a result of the delay I can only get to 
the wedding on time by driving at dangerously high speeds and running red lights. Clearly I am 
not permitted to drive at dangerously high speeds and run red lights. The set of options morally 
available to me is not expanded by the fact that the normal option-set is too restrictive to enable 
me to get to the wedding on time. Moreover, provided that I allowed myself a reasonable 
amount of time to travel to the wedding, and that the traffic jam could not have reasonably been 
foreseen, I think we should deny that by arriving late to the wedding I have violated a duty to my 
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friend. If I had a duty to be on time, then clearly my late arrival would constitute a violation of 
that duty. But we should deny that I had such a duty, and say instead that I had a duty to pursue a 
morally permissible course of action which could reasonably be expected to get me to the wedding on time. (When 
we say that one has a duty to be on time to a friend’s wedding it is, I suggest, this more nuanced 
duty that we actually have in mind. The shorter phrase is convenient short-hand.)  I would 
violate that duty if I carelessly failed to leave myself enough time to travel to the wedding, or if I 
chose to take a particular route in the knowledge that there were likely to be delays along that 
route, and was late as a result. But I would also violate that duty if, after being innocently delayed 
by a traffic jam which I could not have reasonably anticipated, I proceeded to drive at 
dangerously high speeds and run red lights, thereby recklessly endangering other motorists and 
pedestrians. Similarly, by arming oppressive regimes a state violates its duty to provide a 
particular quantity of security if and when that quantity can be provided through morally 
permissible means. 
Now, it might be objected that, in the case I described, driving dangerously fast and 
running red lights is impermissible because the harms it inflicts (including risks) are 
disproportionate to the harms I was trying to avoid (the disappointment my friend would feel if I 
missed his wedding). But, it might be argued, dangerous driving would be permissible in a case in 
which the harms (including risks) it inflicts were proportional to the harms the driver sought to 
prevent. Suppose there is a man in my car who will die unless he receives immediate medical 
attention. In such a scenario, it seems that I would be morally permitted to drive in a manner 
which imposes upon other motorists and pedestrians a degree of risk that is higher than that 
which could permissibly be imposed in less exceptional circumstances. Analogously, it might be 
argued, it is permissible for a state to inflict the harms associated with arming an oppressive 
regime when those harms are proportional to the expected harms it seeks to prevent befalling its 
own citizens, and the harms the US inflicts, or contributes to inflicting, when it arms oppressive 
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regimes are proportional to the expected harms it seeks to prevent – namely, the harms which its 
citizens would suffer if they fell victim to a terrorist attack. 
I do not find this argument convincing. I agree that it is permissible to drive in certain 
ways which would otherwise be impermissible if one is trying to get a dying man to a hospital, 
but considerations about proportionality do not do all of the work in grounding this judgement. 
In order for one’s dangerous driving in such a scenario to be permissible it must be the case that 
the harms (including risks) which one inflicts are limited in size. Even in such exceptional 
circumstances, one is not permitted to drive with complete disregard for the safety of other 
motorists and pedestrians: one must still drive with an adequate degree of due care and attention. 
The point can be brought more sharply into focus with a further example. Consider a child who 
will die unless she receives a heart transplant. If the child’s mother kills someone in order to give 
that person’s heart to her child, the harms she inflicts are proportional to the harms she aims to 
prevent. But no one would think it anything but obvious that the mother acts impermissibly. 
The thought underlying this conviction is that, except perhaps in the most exceptional of 
circumstances, it is simply impermissible to inflict certain, serious, harms upon innocent 
individuals, even if, by inflicting such harms, one could prevent comparable harms from befalling 
others. Do the harms generated by weapons transfers to oppressive regimes fall into this 
category? I think that, at least in certain (not unrepresentative) cases, our answer to this question 
must be affirmative. One country which received large quantities of US weapons in the 
aftermath of 9/11 is Uzbekistan, a country presided over by an authoritarian regime which is 
regularly accused of serious human rights abuses.24 Here is a short excerpt from the US State 
Department’s 2006 Human Rights Report for that country. 
The government’s human rights record, already poor, continued to worsen during the year. 
Citizens did not have the right in practice to change their government through peaceful and 
democratic means. Security forces routinely tortured, beat, and otherwise mistreated detainees 
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under interrogation to obtain confessions or incriminating information. In several cases, 
authorities subjected human rights activists and other critics of the regime to forced psychiatric 
treatment. Human rights activists and journalists who criticized the government were subject to 
harassment, arbitrary arrest, politically motivated prosecution, and physical attack. The 
government generally did not take steps to investigate or punish the most egregious cases of 
abuse… The government continued to refuse to authorize an independent international 
investigation of the alleged killing of numerous unarmed civilians during the violent disturbances 
of May 2005.25 
Elaborating, the report notes that ‘torture and abuse were systematic’, and that methods used by 
security forces included ‘suffocation, electric shock, deprivation of food and water, and sexual 
abuse…’ Security forces were accused of abusing human rights activists by ‘dropping them onto 
concrete floors, forcing needles under their fingernails, suffocating them with gas masks, and 
burning their skin with lighted cigarettes’.26 
It is hard to imagine anyone denying that these are serious harms. Moreover, weapons 
transfers contribute to these serious harms in at least four ways: first, they provide tools with 
which security forces coerce, maim, and kill; second, they increase the power of the state relative 
to internal dissident groups; third, they increase the power of the state relative to members of the 
international community which may wish to intervene to protect basic rights; fourth, arms 
transfers constitute a form of international cooperation, and thus demonstrate that such 
cooperation is not contingent upon respect for basic rights: they counteract any verbal 
exhortations made by the exporting state, and reveal that opportunities for cooperation will be 
forthcoming irrespective of whether basic rights are respected. 
With these considerations in mind I resubmit my original claim: states are morally 
required to refrain from selling weapons to oppressive regimes. When states provide arms to 
oppressive regimes such as the one in power in Uzbekistan they enhance and sustain grave 
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threats to the security of the individuals who are subject to the power of those regimes, and 
thereby contribute to the infliction of serious harms which may not permissibly be inflicted. 
III. 
In this section I consider two further objections which can be pressed against the claim just 
propounded, namely, that states must refrain from selling weapons to oppressive regimes. First, 
it might be argued that arms sales to oppressive regimes can pave the way to improvements in 
the human rights practices of those regimes. When a state transfers weapons to an oppressive 
regime, it can win favour with that regime, and request that it reciprocate in certain ways, e.g. by 
being more respectful of human rights. I do not think that anyone willing to think objectively 
about these matters will take this argument very seriously. It might be true that, under certain 
circumstances, certain oppressive regimes will be willing to do certain things in return for 
weapons, especially if those weapons are provided at a discounted price. But there are a wide 
variety of incentives which states can offer in an attempt to influence the behaviour of 
oppressive regimes, and common sense indicates that weapons – tools which increase the ease 
with which oppressive regimes can violate the rights of their subjects – are among the least 
appropriate of those incentives. 
A second argument runs as follows. Given that oppressive regimes will inevitably acquire 
weapons from somewhere, they may as well acquire them from us (i.e. liberal democratic states). 
Indeed, the argument continues, an oppressive regime purchasing arms from us is preferable to 
an oppressive regime purchasing weapons from another oppressive or illiberal regime. The 
largest five arms exporters are Britain, France, the US, Russia, and China27, and, according to the 
current argument, it would be better for an oppressive regime like Uzbekistan to enter into an 
arms agreement with one of the three relatively liberal democracies on that list than to enter into 
an arms agreement with Russia or China. This is for a variety of reasons. First, as we have just 
noted, arms exporters may be able to exert some degree of influence over their trading partners, 
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and it would be better for an oppressive regime to be influenced by a liberal democracy than by 
another oppressive or illiberal regime. Second, the revenues Russia and China derive from arms 
sales to oppressive regimes will be used, inter alia, to augment their own arsenals. If we are 
concerned to minimize the quantities of weapons acquired by oppressive and illiberal regimes 
(and minimization is the only realistically achievable goal), we should do our best to deny such 
regimes access to the funds needed to buy and produce weapons, even if that means stealing 
their would-be trading partners in the international arms market – which may well be other 
oppressive regimes. Third, successful sales boost the profits of our arms industry, irrespective of 
who those sales are to, and our arms industry can invest those profits back into production of 
weapons systems for use by our own armed forces, and thereby enhance our security. 
One way to respond to this argument is to reject its consequentialist reasoning, but it can 
also be challenged on its own consequentialist terms. Three points should be acknowledged. 
First, states will buy weapons from the firm which offers them the best deal. When firms 
compete for a particular customer they will often drive down their prices in order to match those 
offered by their counterparts. By permitting our firms to offer weapons to an oppressive regime, 
we increase the competitiveness of that particular market, and thereby enable the regime in 
question to acquire weapons at a lower price, and thus a larger quantity of weapons, than it 
would otherwise have been able to acquire. (One weakness of this argument is that, if we 
permitted our firms to drive down prices, we would also reduce the income which oppressive 
states may derive from arms sales.) Second, we may possess certain types of weapons, or 
weapons of a particularly high quality, which other potential suppliers lack. This is certainly true 
of the US. Thus, by transferring arms to an oppressive regime the US enables it to become more 
effective at oppressing its subjects than it would otherwise have been. Third, by trading arms 
with an oppressive regime we forego any possibility of persuading third parties to refrain from 
engaging in such trade. If we demonstrate a willingness to surrender the benefits of trading with 
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certain oppressive regimes, we may have a chance of convincing others to surrender those 
benefits too. The moment we provide weapons, that chance vanishes.28 Relatedly, at our disposal 
are a variety of coercive economic measures which may be used against those who trade arms 
with particular oppressive regimes. But clearly we could not employ such measures if we were 
also trading with those regimes. 
The two objections considered in this section fail. Selling weapons to oppressive regimes 
cannot be defended on the grounds that doing so may lead to improvements in the human rights 
practices of those regimes, or on the grounds that oppressive regimes will inevitably be able to 
acquire weapons from some source or other. Therefore, my initial claim stands: states are 
morally required to refrain from selling weapons to oppressive regimes. 
IV. 
In the previous two sections I argued that in order to respect the right to security possessed by 
individuals subject to the power of oppressive regimes, states must refrain from providing arms 
to such regimes. In this section I consider the moral permissibility of transferring arms to rebel 
groups waging revolutionary war against oppressive regimes. A concern for the security rights of 
those ruled by oppressive regimes gives us a prima facie reason to welcome the overthrow of 
those regimes, and to support the groups attempting to overthrow them. But that same concern 
also casts doubt on the strategy of supporting those groups by arming them. 
Before I proceed, one clarification should be made. In what follows, I do not distinguish 
between trading and the broader notion of transferring. States often simply give, rather than sell, 
weapons to rebel groups, and if one thinks there is sometimes a moral duty to supply weapons to 
rebel groups that duty is surely best conceived of as a duty to give weapons free of charge, rather 
than as a duty to supply weapons in some way, including via the market. But, for present 
purposes, the distinction between trading and transferring is not germane. The issues I raise 
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concern the provision of weapons to rebel groups per se, not the manner of that provision, and I 
will tend to speak simply of ‘arming’ rebel groups. 
Given that arming is one form of supporting, determining (a) if and when it is 
permissible to arm rebel groups involves (b) determining if and when it is permissible to support 
rebel groups in some way. My intention is to focus on the distinctive issues which arise in 
relation to the former concern, but one general point about supporting rebel groups needs to be 
made first. If supporting a rebel group is to be permissible, it seems clear that several conditions, 
adapted from traditional just war theory, must be satisfied: the rebel group must have a just cause 
– the aim of the group cannot be to overthrow one oppressive regime and replace it with 
another; the harms which will occur if the rebels, with outside assistance, continue to fight must 
be proportional to the harms which the war effort can be expected to prevent; the war must be 
necessary – alternative means of overthrowing the regime must be unavailable; and it must be 
reasonable to expect that the rebel group, at least if it receives outside help, will not deliberately 
inflict violence upon non-combatants. These conditions will be relevant in what follows. 
Arming a rebel group might be impermissible even if supporting it in other ways is not. 
This might be true for a variety of reasons, but I shall focus on one. Arming rebel groups has a 
notable shortcoming which some other means of support do not share, viz. the advantages 
conferred by certain forms of support can be terminated at any time, but the advantages 
conferred by the provision of weapons cannot. Compare and contrast three states, one of which 
supports a rebel group by providing arms (state A), one of which supports a rebel group by 
providing troops to fight alongside the rebels (state B), and one of which supports a rebel group 
by providing air support (state C). If state B decides at some point that it no longer wishes to 
support the revolution, it can simply recall its troops. Similarly, if state C decides that it no longer 
wishes to support the revolution it can simply recall its jets. State A, by contrast, is in a very 
different situation. It cannot simply ask for its weapons back. It can refuse to provide additional 
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weapons, of course, but there is little it can do about the weapons it has already sent: it lost 
control of those the second they entered rebel hands. It is true that the ammunition A provided 
will eventually run out. But that does not change the fact that the advantages provided by A’s 
policy extend into the future in a way which the advantages provided by B and C do not. And 
while the ammunition will run out, the weapons themselves can be used again and again. One 
can imagine a future world in which weapons feature self-destruct mechanisms which can be 
remotely triggered. In such a world, state A could cease its provision of support for the rebel 
group as easily and immediately as states B and C. But until such technical innovations come 
about, states which support rebel groups by providing arms suffer the disadvantage I have 
mentioned. 
Why are these considerations morally salient? It was noted earlier that certain conditions 
must be met if support for a rebel group is to be permissible. The important point to 
acknowledge now is that those conditions, or at least some of those conditions, might obtain one 
day, but not the next. For example, at time T it might be reasonable to believe that the rebel 
group one is contemplating supporting will not deliberately inflict violence upon non-
combatants, but at time T + n it might became painfully clear that that belief was unfounded. A 
rebel group which had hitherto behaved in a morally appropriate manner might suddenly start 
engaging in attacks on civilians. Such a scenario is not at all improbable. As Allen Buchanan has 
recently explained, rebel groups often face strong pressures to engage in immoral conduct, and 
those pressures can intensify over time. This can happen if, for example, the regime the rebels 
are trying to overthrow attempts to dissuade people from participating in the revolution by 
increasing the penalties it imposes on those who engage in revolutionary activity. When a regime 
does this, rebels have a strong incentive to impose penalties on those who do not take part in the 
revolution: doing so may be their only way of maintaining participation at adequate levels.29 If 
the penalties the rebel group decides to impose are excessive – if, say, it decides to execute those 
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who refuse to participate – continuing to support the revolution will be morally unacceptable, 
and states wishing to honour their moral obligations will wish to terminate support. Now, states 
which have supported the revolution by sending troops or jets will be able to terminate support 
immediately; by contrast, states which have supported the revolution by providing weapons will 
not. 
It might be objected that the contrast I have drawn between a state which supports a 
revolution by sending troops or fighter planes, on the one hand, and a state which supports a 
rebel group by providing weapons, on the other, is not as sharp as I have suggested. It might be 
pointed out, for example, that a state which sends troops to assist rebel fighters cannot revoke 
the advantages it has already conferred – it cannot change the fact that its troops have, say, killed 
numerous regime soldiers – and so its situation is no different to that of a state which sent 
weapons. This objection misses the point. It is true that a state which sent troops or jets to 
support a rebel group cannot, at time T, revoke advantages which its policy conferred at time T 
– n. But that is also true of a state which sent weapons. The point is that a state which sends 
weapons has committed itself to continuing to confer further advantages well into the future, 
whether it wants to confer those advantages or not. To put the point crudely, weapons are a gift 
that keeps on giving. 
I should stress that my aim here has not been to show that supporting rebel groups by 
sending troops or providing air support is better, all things considered, than supporting rebel 
groups by providing them with weapons. I have described other methods of supporting rebel 
groups solely for the purpose of illustrating a distinctive problem with arming them, and I have 
not meant to suggest that these other methods do not have their own distinctive shortcomings: 
they certainly do. Aerial bombing, for example, comes with a high risk of civilian casualties. It 
should also be noted that the problem I have identified with transferring weapons also applies, 
mutatis mutandis, to some other methods of support. For example, if a state trains members of a 
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rebel group in combat it cannot then ‘untrain’ them if it decides it no longer wishes to provide 
assistance. Intervening in revolutions is fraught with difficulty, and all methods of support have 
attendant risks. It is, nevertheless, important to emphasize the dangers associated with the 
provision of arms, for that strategy is often perceived to be superior to more direct forms of 
military intervention which tend to be eschewed when possible on the grounds that they put 
troops in harm’s way, upset the electorate, and are extremely expensive. The US has recently 
supplied weapons to rebel forces in Syria but has resisted calls for other types of action. The 
upshot of the considerations adduced here is that providing arms should not be regarded as an 
unproblematic way of assisting rebel groups which is necessarily preferable to other available 
methods. By transferring weapons to a rebel group states provide that group with the means to 
violate the security rights of their fellow countrymen and countrywomen. Provided that the war 
the rebels are waging meets the criteria adumbrated above, a state supplying weapons does not 
violate negative duties generated by the right to security. But it must acknowledge the risks 
associated with arming rebel groups, and take those risks seriously when deciding what course of 
action to take. They must do their best to ensure that their intervention does not undermine the 
physical safety of the very people they are seeking to help. 
Conclusion: 
We have seen that the arms trade has an important role to play in ensuring that that right to 
security is protected. But we have also seen that the right to security generates duties to restrict 
the arms trade in significant ways. Weapons which pose a disproportionately large threat to non-
combatants must not be traded, and weapons should not be sold to oppressive regimes. We also 
saw that while we may have good reasons to support rebel groups attempting to overthrow 
oppressive regimes, supporting such groups by arming them is, from a moral perspective, highly 
problematic. 
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